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 In most industrialized countries, issues
concerning sound and sustainable finances
are high on the political agenda. Ever-growing
debt burdens induce rising interest payments
and force politicians to economize on other
spending items. There is also a clear and
urgent need for a reform of the welfare state,
since a rapidly aging population and rising
unemployment impose increasing constraints
on generous welfare programs. Traditional
fiscal indicators based on cash-flow accounts
fail to address aging phenomena because
future liabilities of pay-as-you-go retirement
and health care systems are absent from
current fiscal flows. Hence, cash-flow deficits
and the size of outstanding debt are unreliable
as indicators of fiscal sustainability and the
debt and deficit criteria for fiscal ‘harmoniza-
tion’, such as those of the Maastricht treaty1,




* Corresponding Address: Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Bertoldstrasse
17, D-79085 Freiburg, phone: +49-761-203-2354, fax: +49-761-203-2290, email: raffelhu@vwl.uni-
freiburg.de.
1. The Maastricht criteria for qualifying as a member of the European Monetary Union (EMU) called for sub-
stantial fiscal consolidation with respect to both public sector budget deficits and the stock of outstanding pub-
lic debt. Except under special circumstances, each prospective member country’s budget deficit had to be below
3 percent of GDP and the public debt less than 60 percent by 1997. 
This paper focuses on the problems involved in developing cross-country comparisons of
the intergenerational stance of fiscal policy. Of course, these comparisons are nowadays
based on the method of generational accounting and in particular most of them rely on
comparing the total size of intertemporal public liabilities (IPLs). I first utilize the machinery
of generational accounting in order to calculate the composition of the countries` IPLs,
that is the sum of explicit and implicit liabilities embedded in the respective fiscal policies
for several European countries and the United States. The findings suggest that the ranking
in a cross-country comparison is very sensitive to a) the legal settings concerning social
transfer adjustment over time, b) the degree to which unreliable or time-inconsistent
reforms are taken into account, c) the respective countries` business cycle status in the
base-year. The second aim of this paper is to outline recent and future applications of
generational accounting.  JEL Classification: E6, H6, J1fact, according to Kotlikoff (1992:p12) they
are simply „number[s] in search of a concept“.
To judge the factual state of public
finances, it is imperative to integrate the
future demographic environment and its
possible budgetary consequences within the
legal and institutional settings of the country
considered. In order to precisely specify the
intertemporal stance of fiscal policy, Alan
Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale and Laurence
Kotlikoff (1991, 1992, 1994) have developed
in a series of articles an alternative measure of
the intertemporal stance of current fiscal
policy: The method of generational
accounting. In short: Generational accounts
do not focus on current annual cash-flows as
does the traditional approach. Instead, they
report for every generation alive the re-
maining net payments to the budget and
distribute the resulting burden, or surplus,
equally on all future generations. Since all
expenditures and revenues are measured in
present values, the intertemporal budget
constraint of the public sector states that there
is no free lunch, that is, expenditures have to
be paid for either by present or by future
generations. Generational accounts sensibly
rely on intertemporal rather than annual
measures of fiscal policy. It is exactly this long-
term viewpoint, which distinguishes genera-
tional accounting from traditional annual
budget accounting.
Ever since introduced in the early 90s,
generational accounting has become a must
in the toolbox of any applied economist. This
paper uses the machinery of generational
accounting in order to calculate and compare
the composition of the total size of European
and United States’ intertemporal public
liabilities (IPLs) – the sum of the explicit and
implicit liabilities embedded in the national
fiscal policies. Our analysis is restricted to the
U.S., Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and
twelve member states of the EU–Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.2
The findings suggest that present fiscal
policies of all countries with the exception of
Ireland have positive IPLs and, hence, are
unsustainable in the long run. The
quantitative findings are, however, not robust,
that is, the ranking among the countries
considered here is very sensitive to 1) the legal
settings concerning the indexation of social
transfers over time, 2) the degree to which
unreliable or time-inconsistent reforms are
taken into account, 3) the status of the
business cycle in the respective countries.
The outline of the paper is as follows: As a
point of departure, Section 2 reports and
discusses the demographic trends in Europe
and the United States. Section 3 provides a
brief description of the method adopted for
estimating IPLs. Section 4 reports IPLs for
the 16 countries considered here and
decomposes them between explicit and
implicit liabilities. This is first done for the
respective legal settings which were valid in
the base-year 1995. In particular, the
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2. Results for the United States are based upon Gokhale and Raffelhüschen (1999). For Norway and Switzerland,
see Norwegian Ministry of Finance (1999) and Raffelhüschen and Borgmann (2001), respectively. The EU-
studies were undertaken by a team of experts at the request of the European Commission`s Directorate Gener-
al XXI (Task Force on Statutory Contributions). Cf. Keuschnigg et al (1999) for Austria, Dellis and Lüth (1999)
for Belgium, Jensen and Raffelhüschen (1999) for Denmark, Feist et al (1999) for Finland, Crettez et al (1999)
for France, Bonin et al (1999) for Germany, McCarthy and Bonin (1999) for Ireland, Franco and Sartor (1999)
for Italy, Bovenberg and ter Rele (1999) for the Netherlands, Berenguer et al (1999) for Spain, Lundvik et al
(1999) for Sweden, and Cardarelli and Sefton (1999) for the United Kingdom. These studies are downloadable
from http://europa.eu.int/ comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/1999/eers0699en.pdf.countries vary in the indexation of transfers –
some index to cost-of-living, others to wages,
others have mixed systems. The section also
contains the resulting IPLs derived under the
assumption that 1) all transfers were indexed
according to wage-growth and 2) time-
inconsistent reforms were not taken into
account. Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Point of Departure:
Demographic Trends in the Western
World3
The driving force behind the implicit
demands on future public budgets is the
demographic transition underway in Europe
and the United States. In general, all
developed countries have one phenomenon
in common: a significant “double aging” of
the population. Because of the baby-boom
and subsequent baby-bust during the postwar
period and because of steady improvements
in longevity, future populations in these
countries will not only contain a greater
proportion of elderly, but also a higher
fraction of older elderly individuals. That is,
general population aging will be accompanied
by an aging of the elderly population itself. 
Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon as an
example for the German population by
reporting the respective cohort sizes of males
and females in the years 1995, 2015, 2035
Generational accounting – Quo Vadis? 77












































A Typical Population Aging Process, Germany 1998–2055and 2055 in terms of the so-called population
pyramid. Like in all other countries con-
sidered here, the shape of the present figure
resembles rather some sort of Christmas tree
than a pyramid. With a very high probability,
this tree-shaped structure will evolve to the
well-known mushroom form, indicating that
in 2035, the aging process will be most
dramatic, subsiding only in later years when
the baby-boomer generations will have faded
away. 
The consequences for the elderly
dependency ratio, that is, the ratio of the
population aged 60 and older to that aged
between 20 and 59 are tremendous.4 Figure 2
shows how the ratio for the respective years
1995, 2015, 2035 and 2055 will increase if
the most likely official population projections
for the various countries will prove true. All
countries are projected to experience a signi-
ficant increase in their elderly dependency
ratios over the next 15 years. The gain in the
ratio is largest for Finland, but Sweden and
Italy are prominent as countries that will
experience the steepest increase in the size of
the elderly relative to the working-aged
population. By 2015, more than half of the
populations of these three countries will be
aged 60 or older. By contrast, the elderly
dependency ratio will be at a modest 37
percent in the United States. 
Population aging will continue in Europe
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4. The cut-off age was chosen at 60 because this is the effective retirement age in public pension systems in most







1995 30,2 37,1 39,0 34,1 35,2 28,6 30,5 37,1 29,9 39,5 35,7 38,1 37,7 34,7 41,4 34,0
2015 37,5 43,8 45,3 45,0 44,0 35,5 43,6 46,9 37,1 53,0 47,3 45,1 43,8 42,3 54,9 51,7
2035 59,2 59,7 60,5 60,6 51,5 52,3 65,3 62,2 51,3 79,7 69,2 74,5 57,8 66,2 66,8 60,9
2055 75,1 59,0 58,5 63,8 43,9 56,5 61,0 64,1 54,8 78,4 68,8 90,4 56,2 65,5 66,5 60,6
IR NO B CH DK IC NL F US IT GE SP UK AU SW FI
Figure 2.


































9well beyond the first two decades of the next
century. In Italy, nearly four out of every nine
persons will be aged 60 or older by 2035. In
Sweden, Austria, and Germany, two of every
five persons will be elderly according to the
criterion used here. Again, the population in
the United States will be relatively much
younger with only one of every two persons
in the elderly category. Except in Ireland and
Spain, where elderly dependency ratios
continue to rise beyond 2035, the process of
population aging will cease after about five
decades.
Population aging has two dimensions: Not
only will there be more elderly individuals in
the future, healthier lifestyles and medical
advances will lead to an expanding population
of the older old. Figure 3 shows dependency
ratios for the oldest-old—the ratio of those
aged 75 or more to those aged 20-59—for
the years 1995, 2015, 2035 and 2055. This
ratio is at or just over 10 percent for most of
the countries considered here (the UK, at 15,
is an exception). By 2035, this ratio is
expected to roughly double for 12 of the 15
European countries considered here. By 2055,
it almost triples for Ireland, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, France, Austria, Sweden and
Finland. The ratio more than triples for Italy:
by 2055, roughly two out of every five Italians
will be aged 75 or older. In the United States,
this ratio is expected to increase through
2035, but then fall back slightly by 2055.
Overall, the elderly dependency ratio will
almost double in the next three decades and
the oldest-old dependency ratio will close to
triple by the middle of the next century.
Obviously, the double aging process is a
discomforting but highly likely outlook. The
impacts on the stance of fiscal policy are










1995 10,8 13,6 11,2 11,6 12,3 9,1 9,6 11,3 10,3 11,5 10,1 12,9 15,4 9,6 10,7 9,6
2015 17,4 13,9 15,6 15,8 12,4 10,5 13,7 17,0 15,6 20,6 10,9 14,4 19,5 10,9 14,1 12,9
2035 24,1 23,6 21,8 25,4 16,9 19,5 25,5 24,9 25,1 29,0 19,7 20,2 28,8 20,3 22,4 23,6
2055 27,4 25,9 22,7 30,2 16,2 22,4 26,4 27,4 23,1 38,4 21,6 21,5 29,0 31,6 26,7 24,8
IR NO B CH DK IC NL F US IT GE SP UK AU SW FI
Figure 3.


































9captured with the help of the intertemporal
public liabilities derived from national
generational accounting studies. The




While calculating the generational accounts
as well as the IPLs, it is instructive to start
with the government’s intertemporal budget
constraint. This constraint states that the
government’s future net taxes must be just
sufficient to service or repay its net explicit





Here, Bt stands for the public sector’s net
explicit debt in the base year, t; Ts represents
actual net taxes collected in future years
indexed by s; and R=1+r represents a discount
factor where the assumed interest rate is r.
The term ‘net taxes’ is shorthand for ‘unified
primary budget surpluses:’ It refers to
aggregate public sector taxes less expenditures
on non-interest transfers and purchases of
goods and services. Actual future net taxes
depend upon future fiscal policy changes.
Hence, in general, actual future net taxes will
differ from those that would be collected if
the current set of fiscal policies were
maintained indefinitely. The latter is denoted
by the T*
s. Equation 1 need not hold when
T*
s is substituted in place of Ts. If it does not,
it is standard convention to consider current
fiscal policy as being unsustainable: If the
present value of net taxes exceeds Bt, fiscal
policy would need to be changed to avoid a
wasteful accumulation of resources with the
government.5 Alternatively, fiscal policy
would have to be altered to avoid government
debt default if the present value of net taxes
falls short of Bt.
I will report the size of the intertemporal
public liabilities (IPL) embedded in each
countries existing fiscal policy.6 This measure
is defined by rewriting equation 1 as: 
∞






As is evident from equation 2, the value of
IPL reflects both explicit and implicit
government liabilities, the latter caused, for
example, by generous pay-as-you-go
retirement programs at a time of rapid
population aging. The size of IPL also
indicates the extent of policy adjustment
necessary to restore fiscal sustainability: If
positive, the government’s total expenditure
commitments (including interest payments
on its explicit debt) exceed prospective
revenues under status quo conditions and net
taxes must be increased at some point in the
future. If negative, the IPL indicates the extent
to which taxes should be reduced.
Let us turn to the question of how to
measure the IPLs. First, Bt is easily measured
as the government’s financial indebtedness
less its tangible and financial assets.7
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5. Note that the first term in equation 1 evaluates the present value of the stream of net taxes through the indefi-
nite future.
6. In the literature, this indicator is also called “generational balance gap” or “true debt.” See Raffelhüschen (1999a)
for a broader discussion.
7. Intra-agency debt – that is liabilities of the government held in other government accounts – is not included in
the calculation. Measuring the second term on the right-
hand-side of equation 2 is more difficult since
it requires projections of future government
taxes and expenditures under current policy.
Reliable projections of taxes, transfers, and
government purchases of goods and services
are available for only a few of the countries
analyzed here. Fortunately, generational
accounts have been estimated for most
European countries and for the United States.
Its machinery offers a relatively straight-
forward way of projecting future government
revenues and expenditures under prevailing
fiscal policies.8
For those countries where projections of
aggregate taxes, transfers, and government
spending on goods and services are not
available or are not reliable, these aggregates
are project using a standard procedure. For
each country, relative profiles of taxes and
transfers by age and sex are available for the
base year (1995). These profiles are obtained
from micro-data surveys, one for each tax and
transfer category in each country.9 The
available tax profiles cover all forms of
statutory payments to the government and
transfer profiles reflect both in-cash and in-
kind benefits.10The relative-profile values for
government purchases of goods and services
are assumed to equal 1 for each age and sex
because of the “public good” nature of these
outlays.11 Because they reflect the age- and
sex-specific distribution of taxes, transfers,
and purchases of goods and services across the
population, the set of profiles for a given
country constitute a detailed representation
of the fiscal policy prevailing in that country
during the base year.
Next, for each country, aggregate taxes,
transfers, and government purchases in the
base year (at all levels of government-federal,
state, and local) are distributed among
individuals alive in that year according to the
corresponding age-sex relative profiles. This
procedure yields per capita taxes, transfers,
and government purchases for the base year.
For future years, profiles of per capita taxes,
transfers, and government purchases are
obtained by applying an assumed long-run
growth factor of 1.5 percent per year to the
base year’s per capita profiles. Let h*x
a,i,t
represent the ith type of tax per capita for a
person of sex x aged a in year t. Then, the ith
per capita tax in year s>t is calculated as:
*x              *x
(3) ha,i,s = ha,i,t(1 + g)
s–t
.
The same growth factor is used for every
country included in this study. Appropriate
modifications are made to future per capita
values in those cases where recent fiscal policy
changes imply future changes in the
distribution of taxes or transfers by age and
sex. Next, for each country, two profiles of
per capita net taxes – taxes net of transfers
Generational accounting – Quo Vadis? 81
8. For a brief description of generational accounting see Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff (1991, 1992, 1994).
The method employed in this paper follows the standards developed in the European Commission’s project
Generational Accounting in Europe. Cf Raffelhüschen (1999b,c).
9. See the references mentioned in footnote 2.
10. All available information was used to derive age-sex profiles for the various types of taxes and transfers. When-
ever there was insufficient information to distinguish payments by age or sex, the base-year aggregate amount
is distributed equally by age and sex.
11. For some countries, such as the United States, government purchases on goods and services are distributed ac-
cording to a few age-sex categories. However, the part of government spending that represents purchases of pure
public goods – such as defense – is distributed uniformly across the living population. and net of government purchases of goods
and services – are computed (one for each sex)
for each future year s: 
*x              *x
(4) ηa,s =
i ha,i,s.
Finally, aggregate taxes net of transfers and
net of purchases of goods and services for
future years are computed as:




x   a=0ηa,sP a,s.
In equation (5), Px
a,s stands for the number of
individuals of sex x aged a in year s. Country
specific population projections based on
assumptions on mortality, fertility, and
immigration consistent with those of official
medium-term estimates of future demo-
graphic trends were employed in the
calculations.12
For countries where reliable long-term
projections are not available, the country
authors use the method described above to
obtain future aggregate taxes, transfers and
government spending. For others, such as
United States, where reliable medium and
long-term projections are available from
official government agencies, we use the
method described above to extend the
projections beyond the last year available. The
projections are extended sufficiently far out
into the future so that adding more years
makes no appreciable difference to present
value calculations – that is, until the second
term on the right-hand-side of equation 2 has
converged.
Cross-country Findings
Cross-country studies require a broad
common platform to maintain comparability.
On a first glance, this concerns a range of
assumptions concerning 1) the discount rate,
2) the future economic development, 3) the
underlying demographic trends for the future,
etc. Taking a closer look, the harmonization
of these assumptions is by far not sufficient.
A more sophisticated platform to be defined
is the proper way of finding a common
ground for what is subsumed under the
heading base-case fiscal policy. In general,
everything that has been passed into law in a
country is part of the present fiscal policy and
should be considered. But does that also mean
to include reform proposals, like severe
pension cuts, which concern only the distant
future and which are very likely to be
withdrawn even before their impacts would
occur? Or what about medium term
projections of the fiscal authorities represen-
ting more a wishful thought than reality? In
the findings to be presented subsequently for
the 16 countries considered here, more than
30 national experts decided about these issues
autonomously according to their own
judgment. Whether these stand more for best
guesstimates or fairly good estimates remains
to be seen but every cross-country study
hitherto done relies on exactly this co-
ordination process.13
Another more sophisticated standardiza-
tion is required when it comes to the
treatment of future growth in transfers. Some
of the countries considered here adjust their
pension payments, welfare money etc. with a
pure cost-of-living or consumer price index,
others index transfers to a certain degree to
82 Bernd Raffelhüschen
12. For the country-specific data sources, see the references listed in footnote 2.
13. Cf. Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Leibfritz (1999), Kotlikoff and Raffelhüschen (1999), Raffelhüschen (1999b),
Gokhale and Raffelhüschen (1999) and European Commission (1999).
∑
∑∑the growth rate of net or even gross wages. A
typical representative of the first type is the
Beveragian approach of the UK while the
Bismarckian approach in Germany might
stand for the second type of indexation. Of
course there are also mixed strategies like in
Switzerland where pensions are adjusted by
an index halfway between the aforementioned
extremes. To make things even worse, some
countries have wage indexation in some
transfers and cost-of-living indexation in
others.
There is, however, a huge gap between the
legal setting and the effective indexation of
transfers over time. To see this, note that pure
cost-of-living adjustment would eventually
result in a poor minimal standard of income.
In fact, imagining this for a period spanning
over the last hundred years, welfare money
would have a purchasing power sufficient for
subsistence in line of what was the standard
in 1900. On the other hand, wage-growth
indexation has always been deferred in times
of poor economic performance in the
Bismarckian systems. As in most cases, the
truth lies somewhere in between, but where
exactly? In order to avoid an arbitrary
reference point, cross-country comparisons
so far have chosen two different ways of
standardization. Auerbach, Kotlikoff and
Leibfritz (1999) as well as Kotlikoff and
Raffelhüschen (1999) defined the current law
as the point of departure, that is, the numbers
for each country are based on different types
of transfer adjustments. In contrast, Raffel-
hüschen (1999b), Gokhale and Raffel-
hüschen (1999) and the European Commi-
ssion (1999) standardized the national studies
to a net wage index, which was in some cases
against current law.
Subsequently, we will illustrate the differ-
ences in the transfer indexation as well as the
aforementioned definitions of the present
fiscal policy by focusing on two different
scenarios: Figure 4 shows country-specific
IPLs under current law while Figure 5 reports
the IPLs assuming that all transfers are
indexed to GDP growth and too unrealistic
reforms would not be administrated in the
future, that is, when their effects would be
sensible for future voters. The countries in
Figure 4 (and earlier figures) are sorted in
ascending order according to their total IPLs
as of 1995. The figure also shows the
magnitudes of explicit liabilities (public sector
net outstanding debt in 1995) and implicit
liabilities calculated according to the method
described earlier.
The ascending order starts with Ireland,
which even accumulates a small intertemporal
wealth amounting to 4.3 percent of GDP, and
runs the way to Finland whose intertemporal
liabilities amount to a sky-rocketing 250
percent of GDP. In fact, the overall European
perspective is one of severe intertemporal
fiscal imbalance with the notable exception
of Ireland, Norway and Belgium. I will start
to comment on these countries. Despite
Ireland`s relatively significant population
aging and high level of explicit debt, the
country`s 1995 fiscal policies generate a
surplus of future net taxes relative to non-
interest expenditures, which is more than
sufficient to repay the explicit debt. To a
certain degree the tremendous implicit
surpluses are due to the rather late population
aging. Just the opposite holds true for
Norway. As an archetypal Scandinavian wel-
fare state the 1995 fiscal policy generates huge
implicit liabilities. However, the value of
Norway’s rich petroleum reserves, which are
to an overwhelming fraction controlled by
the government, reaches almost the same
amount of twice the 1995-GDP. Also
Belgium has surprisingly low IPLs although
its explicit debt is the highest among the
countries covered by this study. It is exactly
the urgent need to cut back this explicit debt,
Generational accounting – Quo Vadis? 83which induced Belgian governments already
since the early 1980s to reduce expenditures
and increase taxes even more dramatically. As
a result, the primary surplus increased to
almost 6 percent of GDP in the late 1990s,
which explains the high implicit assets.14
Already the country ranking fourth,
Switzerland, is burdened by total public
liabilities as high as 50 percent of GDP.
Nevertheless, since only 16 percentage points
are implicit liabilities, also Switzerland can be
seen as being close to a sound though not
really sustainable fiscal policy. The UK,
Denmark, Iceland, and the Netherlands
resemble Switzerland closely with total
numbers ranging between 67 and 76 percent
of the respective GDP. Moreover, all of them
display similar low implicit liabilities with the
major part of the total being due to ever-
increasing explicit debt figures. The
similarities in the implicit liabilities can only
be explained by the very similar Beverage
approach to social policy, that is, the com-
bination of relatively generous minimum
standards with not too generous and partially
means-tested supplementary welfare systems.
While in the latter cases one still might be
in doubt whether these countries can be said
to have achieved sound public finances in the
long run, these doubts will definitely not be
valid for France and the United States with














explicit 72 -191 122 34 51 60 44 65 36 29 106 58 63 50 37 -8
implicit -76 200 -103 16 16 12 28 11 46 59 1 78 89 143 200 262
true debt -4 10 19 50 67 71 72 76 81 87 107 136 152 193 237 253
IR NO BE CH UK DK IC NL FR US IT GE SP AU SW FI
Figure 4.
Composition of the IPLs in a cross-country comparision (1995), indexation of  















14. Of course, the intention of the Belgian government have been fairly straightforward: Knowing that the Maas-
tricht treaty’s debt/GDP criterion of 60 percent by 1997 was out of reach, the government sought to reduce the
annual deficit to well below the 3 percent threshold in order to overfill the deficit criterion.percent of GDP. In terms of total IPL, France
is approximately in the middle of the group
of the countries considered here with approxi-
mately even explicit and implicit shares of the
total. The United States rank slightly higher,
that is, despite a low explicit debt/GDP ratio,
its IPL/GDP ratio is almost 100 percent
because of relatively high implicit liabilities.
Italy and Germany range next and their
true debt figures exceed the 100 percent level
with figures of 107 and 136 percent of GDP,
respectively. We will later comment on the
Italian case with an unexpected low implicit
debt of just 1 percent of GDP while in the
German case, we find that the Union´s single
largest economy represents approximately the
average intertemporal indebtedness in the
EU. For Spain and Austria, we find a value of
total IPLs well over 150 percent of GDP. In
both cases, we find on top of already high
explicit debt figures even higher implicit ones
stemming from both a significant aging
process and generous pension systems. In
Sweden and Finland, we find sky-rocking
high IPLs which amount to over 200 percent
of the countries’ GDP. This is despite the fact
that Sweden has a rather low explicit debt
figure while Finland has even explicit assets
of about 8 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, in
the Swedish case we find a Scandinavian
welfare state alike Norway but without
petroleum wealth.
Both countries are very interesting also
due to other facts, which are closely related to
the base-year 1995. Sweden was on the way
of preparing major tax and pension reforms
in order to adjust to internal EU settings. In
fact, taking into account these reforms
meanwhile passed into law, Sweden would
range somewhere in the middle of the
countries considered here. Moreover, taking
the medium-term budget projections into
account, Sweden would be very close to the
Danish figures as was pointed out in the study
of Hagemann and John (1999). In the EU
study, however, no medium term budget
projection was taken into account since in
most cases, these numbers could not be seen
as realistic. From a hind-sight perspective this
was not the case for Sweden, which together
with Denmark projected budget surpluses
already by the end of the 1990s.
Finland makes a strong case for research
to be made in the future. As pointed out by
the contribution of Vanne (2001), the
substantial imbalance is to a large extent a
result of the exceptional unfavorable state of
the business cycle of the base year. In fact,
since the exports into the Comecon countries
basically collapsed, the base-year displayed
exceptionally high unemployment rates
combined with high transfer expenditures
and low tax revenues. In the aftermath
Finland had record high growth rates and by
today, Finland´s stance of fiscal policy might
be one of the soundest in Europe. All this is
partially due to changes in fiscal policy
through proper reforms, but to an over-
whelming part it is simply due to business
cycle effects. Obviously, serious efforts have
to be made in the future to control for
unsynchronized business cycle effects while
comparing different countries’ generational
accounting results.
As already mentioned, Figure 5 reports all
IPLs under the assumption that all transfers
are indexed by GDP growth and too
unrealistic reforms would not be admini-
strated in the future. As in Figure 4, the
countries are sorted in ascending order
according to their total IPLs as of 1995. For
Switzerland, the UK and France we find
significantly higher implicit liabilities. The
difference in total IPLs is highest for the UK
and corresponds to an increase of nearly a full
GDP. How can this surprising divergence be
explained? Under current law, the UK provide
for annual benefit up-rating with prices,
Generational accounting – Quo Vadis? 85rather than nominal indexation to wages. This
strategy implies a gradual reduction in transfer
levels relative to earnings. Given real
productivity growth reaches the assumed
1.5 percent, indexing public spending with
consumer prices until years 2000, 2015 and
2030 implies a relative transfer cut by 7.2,
25.8 and 40.6 percent, respectively. This is
what makes the UK figure as low as 67 percent
under the current law regime. But is a transfer
cut of more than 40 percent time-consistent
or will there be a more generous government
at some point of time in the future? The
answer remains to be seen. Nonetheless, if for
reasons of comparability the UK indexed
transfers to GDP growth, implicit liabilities
would be one of the highest in Europe.
Still, on first glance, little in the UK would
hint at this severe intertemporal imbalance
and in fact, the aging process in the UK is
one of the least pronounced in Europe (Cf.
Figures 2 and 3). Nevertheless, the counter-
intuitive results can be explained very
straightforwardly. First, aging in the UK starts
earlier than in the rest of Europe, which
aggravates the financial problem. The transfer
pension system appears to be generally under-
funded since in 1995, the UK tax quota
(38.3 percent of GDP) was the third lowest
in the EU. The scant tax base in the UK fails
to generate sufficient revenue, as soon as the
number of taxpayers begins to fall and the
number of pensioners begins to rise.15













explicit 72 -191 122 60 44 65 29 34 36 58 63 106 51 50 37 -8
implicit -76 200 -103 12 28 11 59 83 100 78 89 75 134 143 200 262
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Figure 5.
Composition of the IPLs in a cross-country comparision (1995), indexation of  















15. For a broader discussion of the UK, cf Cardarelli and Sefton (1999) and Bonin and Raffelhüschen (2000).France are the other two countries, in which
the current law does not imply a wage
indexation of transfer schemes. In both cases,
implicit liabilities would be about half a GDP
higher if all transfers would grow in line with
the underlying GDP growth rate of 1.5
percent. Why are the figures so much lower
than in the case of the UK? Also here, the
answer is straightforward: Under current law,
Switzerland adjusts most welfare payments,
among them the basic pension, according to
a mixed index that combines wage and
consumer price indexation in equal shares. In
the case of France, the 1993 pension reform
indexed pension benefits to consumer prices
instead of wages to pension schemes for
private sector employees. This obviously was
already an important though not sufficient
move towards intergenerational balance.
From the comparison of the cross-country
results under current law and under a uniform
GDP indexation, it should be clear that the
ranking of the countries’ IPLs crucially
depends on what is the underlying
assumption. In general, Beverage systems like
Switzerland, the UK, Denmark or the
Netherlands fare better in cross-country
comparisons since they are typically not very
generous and the benefits are adjusted to
consumer prices. Nevertheless, these systems
adjust in discrete acts of generosity for the
otherwise hidden cuts in relative purchasing
power. When calculating the IPLs in such a
period, the stance of fiscal policy is, of course,
much worse than measured in periods when
expenditure dynamics are slowed down. In
1995, obviously, public budgets have been
under tight control.
Bismarckian approaches to social protec-
tion are, in general, systems which insure
relative income during retirement and other
periods of need by a high tax-benefit-linkage.
Moreover, they are usually indexed according
to gross or net wage growth. As a result, their
financial stance is much less protected against
population aging as compared to Beverage
systems and hence, they fare worse when
doing cross-country comparisons under the
current law. This can be seen from directly
comparing for example Germany and the UK
in Figures 4 and 5. However, Bismarckian
systems tend to react by suspending the wage
indexation or cutting back replacement rates
whenever further growing contribution rates
seem politically inappropriate. Also this is a
kind of discrete adjustment. As a matter of
fact, the two types of social protection systems
do converge in the long run. Nevertheless, as
compared to discrete benefit cuts, discrete
generosity seems to be superior from a public
choice viewpoint.
Another problem in cross country com-
parisons concerns the likelihood that a reform
proposing benefit cuts proves to be time-
inconsistent after having been passed into law.
Italy is a good example for this. To alleviate
the aging pressure on the public pension
system Italian governments enacted two
reforms in the first half of the 1990s: the 1992
“Amato reform” and the 1995 “Dini reform”
both inducing severe cuts in the replacement
rates of public pensions. By comparing the
numbers in Figure 4 and 5, the Italian IPL
would amount to 181 percent instead of 107
if the reforms had not been enacted [cf. Franco
and Sartor (1999)]. Whether the benefit cuts
will turn out to be viable remains to be seen,
the tremendous impact on the ranking of the
IPLs is obvious.
Conclusion
Throughout the Western World, there is a
clear and present need to reform the welfare
state since an aging population, rising
unemployment rates and the lack of com-
petitiveness in a globalized world economy
are imposing more and more constraints on
Generational accounting – Quo Vadis? 87national welfare programs. At the same time,
growing debt burdens induce high interest
payments that also call the sustainability of
present fiscal policy fundamentally into
question and force public decision makers to
economize on other spending items and/or to
increase the already high tax loads.
This paper investigates the demographic
transition and its impact on the inter-
generational stance of current fiscal policy
with the help of generational accounting. We
use the machinery of generational accounting
in order to calculate and compare the
composition of the total size of European and
United States’ intertemporal public liabilities
(IPLs) – the sum of the explicit and implicit
liabilities embedded in the national fiscal
policies. Considering the United States,
Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and twelve
member states of the EU – Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and
the United Kingdom, we find that 1995 fiscal
policies of all countries with the exception of
Ireland have positive IPLs and, hence, are
unsustainable over the long-term. 
Calculating the results under the legal
status quo of 1995, the intergenerational
imbalance indicated by the sheer magnitude
of the IPLs is highest in Finland and Sweden,
where the current government policies shift
an IPL/GDP ratio of over 200 percent of
GDP to future Finns and Swedes. In Austria,
Spain, Germany and Italy the generational
imbalance is also extreme with IPLs ranging
between 193 and 107 percent of GDP. A
lower but still severe imbalance can be found
in the United States, France, the Netherlands,
Iceland, Denmark and the UK. Here we find
intertemporal liabilities between 87 and 67
percent. Finally, minor IPLs can be found in
Switzerland (50 percent), Belgium (19
percent) and Norway (10 percent).
The quantitative findings are, however,
not robust, that is, the ranking among the
countries considered is very sensitive to 1) the
legal settings concerning the transfer
indexation over time, 2) the degree to which
unreliable or time-inconsistent reforms are
taken into account, 3) the status of the
business cycle in the respective countries.
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